Here are a few of the questions we hear most often about Ranked Choice Voting:

Why should Massachusetts adopt Ranked Choice Voting?

Majority rule. A democratic election result should reflect the majority opinion of voters. Under the current system, elections with three or more candidates can be won with less than a majority. Ranked Choice Voting would ensure that an election winner has support from a majority of voters.

More Voices, More Choices. Fear of "spoilers" taking votes away from front-runners or incumbents prevents many candidates from running, and discourages voters from supporting such candidates. This barrier limits the exchange of ideas during the campaign season, limits the choices voters have at the ballot box, and makes it harder for voters to hold politicians accountable.

True Preference. Ranked Choice Voting allows voters to express their true preference without having to make a tactical choice based on who they think is likely to win. It preserves the vote as a truly democratic expression.

Civil Debate. Candidates will want to win second choice votes from the supporters of other candidates. This rewards candidates with a positive message and deters candidates from smearing their opposition.

Save Time and Money. Holding two elections is much more expensive than one. Preliminary elections cost tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars and draw a tiny percentage of registered voters. They also require each voter to make an extra trip to the polls, which costs time and even money for those who have to take time off work to vote. Ranked Choice Voting has all the benefits of holding both a preliminary and general election, but streamlines the process into a single election.

Voter Turnout. Preliminary elections often have extremely low turnout. Low turnouts can cause unpredictable results that do not correspond to the will of the larger electorate. We can't make people vote at preliminary elections, but we can solve this problem altogether by using Ranked Choice Voting and eliminating the preliminary election.

Is there legislation in the State House to enact RCV?

Yes! In fact, there are three bills in the current session that would advance RCV in the commonwealth. Bill H.377, sponsored by State Representative Jay Kaufman, would enact RCV for all state offices, both primary and general elections. It has 15 co-sponsors. Companion bills H.2897/S.380, sponsored by State Representative Mike Connolly and State Senator Jamie Eldridge, respectively, would create a local option for cities and towns to use RCV for their municipal races by passing a law, without changing their charter as is currently required in most cases. The local option bill has 31 co-sponsors, a new record for RCV legislation in Massachusetts.

For which elected offices could RCV be used?

With very few exceptions, all elections in Massachusetts could use RCV. We are in favor of using RCV for all elected offices in the Commonwealth, from local offices like mayor and city councilor, to state legislative seats, county offices like district attorney and sheriff, statewide seats like governor, and federal congressional and senate seats. Ideally, it would be used to choose which presidential candidate receives the state's electoral votes, as well.

The only existing elections to which RCV could not apply would be presidential primaries. In Massachusetts, each party allocates its convention delegates proportionally to the presidential primary contenders, so there's no need for RCV to find a winner within the state. Also, should the National Popular Vote interstate compact take effect, using RCV to choose our individual state's electors would no longer make sense, as the president would be chosen by the popular vote in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. However, if we were to have a national popular vote for president, we favor that vote use RCV nationwide.

What about traditional runoff and "top two" voting systems?

In a traditional runoff system, if no candidate receives a majority of the vote in the election, a separate runoff election is held at a later date between the top two vote-getters. In Louisiana and elsewhere, a traditional runoff systems is used in conjunction with a non-partisan blanket primary, also known as a "jungle primary," in which all candidates from all parties compete in a single primary election. It is possible for two candidates from the same political party to advance from the jungle primary to the runoff. A variant on the jungle primary system is California's "top-two" system, in which the the two top vote-getters advance to the runoff even when a candidate receives an absolute majority in the primary.

Like ranked choice voting, traditional runoff systems ensure the winner has a majority of the vote. However, they attain that laudable goal in a crude fashion. Unlike RCV, which welcomes new voices and choices to our elections, traditional runoff systems yield majority winners by excluding candidates from the final, decisive election. Top-two systems are the worst offenders in this respect, because the final election is guaranteed to only have two voices in the debate. To make matters worse, those two voices may be from the same party, so the breadth and depth of the electoral debate may be especially limited. While traditional runoff systems are superior to plurality, for those interested in expanding the range of choice on the ballot and deepen our political debate, they fall short.

Traditional runoff systems do not eliminate as many spoilers as RCV does either. Consider a primary election between 6 candidates: 2 candidates from party A, each of whom get 20% of the vote, and 4 candidates from party B, each of whom get 15% of the vote. The two candidates from party A would advance to the final election, despite the fact that 60% of the voters chose a candidate from party B. RCV fixes this problem by simulating a series of runoffs, each of which eliminates a single candidate, but with only one trip to the polls.

With the exception of Cambridge, cities in Massachusetts use a top-two system for their municipal elections. If there are three or more candidates for Boston Mayor, for example, all three complete in "preliminary election" and the top two advance to the general. If our cities adopted RCV, they could eliminate these costly and time-consuming preliminary elections and find a majority winner with a single election.

Further reading:
Fix the Top Two Primary: Admirable Goals Don't Justify Indefensible Outcomes
What's the Matter with California Turnout

What about Approval, Score, or Condorcet Voting Methods?

Yes, there are a seemingly endless number of alternative voting systems in existence. Unfortunately, none of them is perfect. Indeed, for any system one can find a desirable property that the system does not satisfy. However unlike these other systems, ranked choice voting is tried, tested, and works well in practice. Approval, score, and Condorcet methods are not used anywhere in the world for governmental elections, so whatever benefits they may convey are unproven in the context of real, political elections.

On the theoretical front, approval and score voting fail a critical test that voting theorists call the majority criterion. This is the simple property that a candidate who is the first choice of an absolute majority of voters should always win. RCV, Condorcet methods, and even plurality voting satisfy this, but approval and score do not. Under approval or score, a candidate could be the first choice of 99% of voters and still lose in theory.

RCV is also one of the few methods that satisfy a property called later-no-harm, which we believe is necessary in the context of high-stakes, competitive elections. Namely, under RCV a vote for your second choice cannot hurt the chances your first choice will be elected; a vote for your third choice does not hurt the chances of your first or second choice; and so on. This is not true under approval, score, or Condorcet voting — a vote for a later choice works against an earlier choice. When a voting system violates later-no-harm, voters face pressure to bullet vote, meaning to cast a vote for only one's first choice. Case in point: approval voting was used to elect the Dartmouth Board of Trustees, but once the Trustees elections became mildly competitive, they abandoned approval due in part to concerns over bullet voting. The more voters bullet vote, the closer the system will resemble plurality in practice, and then we're back to square one in terms of improving our voting system.

We also consider the Condorcet criterion to be important. This is the property that the candidate that would win a head-to-head race against every other candidate should always win. While RCV, approval, and score voting may fail to elect the Condorcet candidate, in practice RCV has done so in virtually every single election. Due to strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet methods, including later-no-harm, and the additional complexity Condorcet requires to resolve cycles, we strongly prefer RCV for political elections.

Furthermore, approval, score, and Condorcet were all designed to be used in single-winner elections only. Ranked choice voting works well for both single-winner and multi-winner elections. For elections that involve a mixture of single-winner and multi-winner races, we strongly prefer the simplicity of using a uniform voting method across the board.

These reasons help explain why ranked choice voting is the preferred voting method of the major electoral reform organizations around the world, including FairVote in the United States and the Electoral Reform Society in the UK. Again, no system is perfect, but if there's one thing all advocates of alternative voting systems agree on it's that our current plurality voting method is surely the worst.

Further reading:
Sightline's Guide to Methods for Electing an Executive Officer
Why Approval Voting is Unworkable in Contested Elections
New Lessons from Problems with Approval Voting in Practice
Single Winner Method Comparison Chart
Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet